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1 Introduction
The application of formal methods in the rigorous deﬁnition and analysis of the
functionality and the behaviour of a system, promises the ability of showing
that the system is correct. Given such a promise, that is already out since
several years, it is astonishing to see how little formal methods are actually
used in the safety critical system industry, though the use of formal methods
is increasingly required by the international standards and guidelines for the
development of complex systems.
Industrial acceptance of formal methods is strictly related to the invest-
ment needed to introduce them, to the maturity of tool support available, and
to the easiness of use of formal methods and tools. Nowadays, the industrial
trend is directed to the adoption of formal veriﬁcation techniques to vali-
date the design, integrating them within the existing development process.
Industries are more keen to accept formal veriﬁcation techniques assessing
the quality attributes of their products, obtained by a traditional life cycle,
rather than a fully formal life cycle development, due to the lower training
and innovation costs of the former. Several approaches to the application of
formal methods in the development process have been proposed, diﬀering for
the degree of involvement of the method within it. Starting from rigorous
speciﬁcations, formal methods can be used for the derivation of test cases,
or as a validation technique aimed at proving that the speciﬁcation satisﬁes
the requirements, or as an auxiliary technique in the automated generation of
code.
The Formal Methods &&Tools Group of ISTI-CNR is active in the ﬁelds
of development and application of formal notations, methods and software
support tools for the speciﬁcation, design and veriﬁcation of complex com-
puter systems. These systems often share important features like concur-
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rent/parallel behaviour, physical distribution and mobility. Moreover, they
often must meet real-time and security constraints and are used in safety-
critical missions where also human factors play a major role.
We are currently involved in several research activities 2 . in this short pa-
per we summarize some results in the areas of application and development of
model-checking algorithms and tools for Embedded/Safety-Critical Systems,
Mobile systems, Security Protocols, UML statechart diagrams
2 Model checking for Embedded Systems
Embedded computer-controlled systems often include fault tolerance tech-
niques. Fault tolerance is the property of a system to provide, by redun-
dancy, a service complying with the speciﬁcation in spite of faults occurred
or occurring [13]. The rigorous deﬁnition and veriﬁcation of these systems is
extremely important, since it promises the ability of showing that a system is
correct also in presence of faults and failures, so that it cannot harm in any
case. For this reason the use of formal speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation techniques
is increasingly required in this ﬁeld.
In recent works we have examined some speciﬁc characteristics of fault
tolerant systems, such as the use of redundancy, with a twofold objective: on
one hand, to show how these characteristics naturally contain the state space
size, and on the other hand, to study the state space reduction techniques more
suited to exploit them [3]. We have used our analysis technique to specify and
verify two fault tolerant system designs. The ﬁrst study is the speciﬁcation
and veriﬁcation of the safety requirements of a Railway Interlocking System
developed by Ansaldo Trasporti [2]. The second one is the speciﬁcation and
veriﬁcation of fault tolerant mechanisms deﬁned inside the project GUARDS
(Generic Upgradable Architecture for Real-Time Dependable Systems) [19].
3 Model checking for mobile systems
Veriﬁcation techniques based on ﬁnite state representations of system behav-
iors cannot be directly applied to those concurrent systems where behaviors
may refer to past steps of the ongoing computation. In this case, even simple
agents can generate inﬁnite state systems. An illustrative example is pro-
vided by the so called mobile systems, i.e. systems where the communication
topology among processes can dynamically evolve when the computation pro-
gresses. The π-calculus [17] gives an example of this situation. Its primitives
are simple but expressive: channel names can be created, communicated and
they are subjected to sophisticated scoping rules. The π-calculus has greater
expressive power than ordinary process calculi, but also a much more compli-
cated theory. In particular, the usual operational models are inﬁnite-state and
2 see also http://matrix.iei.pi.cnr.it/FMT/ for futher details
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inﬁnite branching. Hence, even though the π-calculus generalizes CCS [16],
the semantic-based veriﬁcation tools developed for CCS cannot be directly
reused for the π-calculus.
Recently a veriﬁcation environment, HAL[7], for the π-calculus has been
developed The construction of the veriﬁcation environment takes a direct ad-
vantage of the ﬁnite representation of π-calculus agents presented in [18]. In
fact, the environment includes implementations of facilities which allow a π-
calculus agent to be translated into an ordinary automaton. The theory of
[18] ensures that equivalent ordinary automata are associated to equivalent
π-calculus agents. Hence, existing equivalence checkers for ordinary automata
can be used to calculate whether or not π-calculus agents are equivalent. The
environment also supports veriﬁcation of logical formulae expressing desired
properties of the behaviour of π-calculus agents expressed in terms of π-logic
[10] formulae. The π-logic includes modalities indexed by π-calculus actions
that are translated into a standard temporal logic for ordinary automata. Ex-
isting model checkers can hence be used to verify whether or not a formula
holds for a given π-calculus agent.
These translation facilities have been implemented on top of the JACK
environment [4]. It consists of several speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation tools in-
terfaced around the FC2 format which acts as the “gluing” entity among the
tools.
4 Model checking of security protocols
The wide diﬀusion of Internet as a commercial medium makes the guarantee
of security a necessity for every distributed protocol running over it. Security
protocols, known also as cryptographic protocols, are quite tricky: the liter-
atures is full of signiﬁcative examples of protocols that, although considered
secure for long, revealed dummy ﬂaws when formally checked.
In this ﬁeld our experience has been focused in deﬁning a veriﬁcation frame-
work for the spi-calculus [1], a process algebra derived from the π-calculus with
operators to encrypt and decrypt messages. The spi-calculus is expressive and
ﬂexible enough to easily allow the description of a wide class of cryptographic
protocols. Our approach to security veriﬁcation follows a logic-based model
checking paradigm [6]. This approach requires a temporal logic (for example
the one deﬁned in [8]) to be used for expressing security properties, such as
secrecy and integrity, while the spi-calculus is provided with an operational
semantics based on labeled transition systems on which the satisﬁability re-
lation of logic formulas is deﬁned. In this way we are able to verify a wide
class of security properties (e.g., anonymity) when a ﬁnite state model of a
protocols [11,12] is provided.
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5 Model checking for UML statecharts diagrams
UML ( [20]) Statechart Diagrams are used for describing dynamic aspects of
system behaviour. UML is a semi-formal language, since its syntax and static
semantics (the model elements, their interconnection and the well-formedness
rules) are deﬁned precisely, but its dynamic semantics are not speciﬁed for-
mally. In recent papers we have presented a formal operational semantics
for a behavioural subset of UML Statechart Diagrams (UMLSDs) including
a formal proof of their correctness with respect to major UML semantics re-
quirements concerning behavioural issues [9,15] basing on results exploited
in [14]. In particular we have presented all the conceptual issues related to
building a tool for action based branching time model-checking, for the auto-
matic veriﬁcation of formal correctness of UML Multicharts. The approach we
have proposed preserves all the information necessary to report the results of
model checking in terms of the original UMLSD speciﬁcation. The reference
veriﬁcation environment used for this model checking approach is JACK [4],
where automata are represented in a standard format which facilitates the use
of a collection of tools for automatic veriﬁcation.
Recently we have started a new project aimed at developing an on the
ﬂy Model Checker, UMC, for UML communicating state machines. UMC
is essentially an experiment in the design of an integrated tool for the con-
struction, the exploration, the analysis and the veriﬁcation of the dynamic
behavior of UML models described as a set of communicating state ma-
chines. The current alpha-version of the UMC prototype (which is now at
version 2.3) is accessible ”online” through its www interface at the address
http://matrix.iei.pi.cnr.it/umc/demo.
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